Europe.view
Turn east, Lady Ashton
Feb 11th 2010
From Economist.com
The EU could make a real difference in Ukraine
PIGEONHOLING and false analogies are not part of formal international relations studies. But from the way that diplomats, policymakers and analysts talk about Ukraine, you would think they were compulsory courses.
Take the optimistic point that Ukraine’s elections are now unlike Russia’s. True, Ukrainian voters had a real choice in that country’s recent presidential poll. The incumbent, Viktor Yushchenko, gave up power peacefully. (In Russia, he might have handed power over to an ex-spook, amid bogus terrorist attacks to panic the public into accepting authoritarian rule). The vote count was fair. Ukraine’s media is far more pluralist than Russia’s. And so on. All this is fine. But Ukraine’s election was also unlike Kazakhstan’s. It is easy to make something look good by choosing a dismal comparator.
It is also tempting but wrong to compare Ukraine now with Russia in the 1990s. True, oligarchs rule the roost in both countries, with politicians as their puppets. True, Western money keeps Ukraine afloat, as it did in 1990s Russia. There, the West hoped to avert nuclear anarchy or a Communist revanche. In Ukraine the money is intended to stave off take-over by Russia.
But there is no sign of, or appetite for, a Ukrainian version of Vladimir Putin, not least because the West has not (yet) incinerated its credibility in Ukraine the way it did in Russia in the 1990s. Ukrainian politicians of all stripes, and the public, continue to want European values and European integration.
Brussels has yet to respond to that desire. European leaders missed the chance presented by the orange revolution (though to be fair, Mr Yushchenko and other Ukrainian politicians botched their opportunities even more badly). The European Union’s leaders also failed to make much of the recent election. Ukraine is a long way from Spain, which holds the rotating EU presidency. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s nominal foreign-policy chief, seems distracted, to put it mildly. The EU is treating Ukraine like Turkey—too big, too poor, and destined to wait indefinitely for membership. (That’s a false comparison too, but never mind).
Yet Ukraine is perhaps the one place where Lady Ashton and her new External Action Service could make a real difference. Ukraine badly needs attention, and unlike America or China it is not a place over which other EU leaders will be jostling for influence. Done properly, the gains from renewed EU involvement could be huge.
The European policy so far has been engagement with Ukraine’s political class. This has proved expensive, and mostly fruitless. Attention should now move to the citizenry. Imagine the effect if the EU opened 50 “Europe Houses” in the main towns and cities of Ukraine. The excellent new House of Europe in Tbilisi should be the model. That project aims to be the Georgian centre for all sorts of Europe-related cultural events, as well as debates and lectures, with a library and internet café as added attractions (readers with spare cash please note: it needs donors). It will have far more impact than the piecemeal efforts of individual European countries’ cultural institutes.
In the tense Ukrainian region of Crimea, a big EU presence would make it harder for Russia to hide its mischief-making (that should be a lesson from Georgia, where the EU’s absence was a lethal element in the run up to the 2008 war). More generally, the new policy will focus the EU’s biggest asset: its soft power. The EU’s military capability is meagre; its ability to stand up to Russian divide-and-rule tactics in energy security is feeble. But the EU does have something that the Kremlin doesn’t: attractiveness. Projecting that into Ukraine will give Lady Ashton and her staff something worthwhile to do. It could even work.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
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Europe View nr 171: Ashton to Ukraine |
Thursday, December 03, 2009
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Disquiet on the eastern front |
America, NATO and eastern Europe
Nov 26th 2009 | WASHINGTON, DC
From The Economist print edition
Can a distracted America remain a bulwark for eastern Europe?
DAMAGE control is never as good as damage prevention. Despite repeated reassurances, the countries of eastern Europe are worried about security. Their biggest concern is NATO, where officials are meant to be drafting contingency plans to defend Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Barack Obama pushed this idea at the NATO summit in April. A recent big Russian military exercise, which officials say culminated in a dummy nuclear attack on Poland, highlights the region’s vulnerability.
Yet little is happening. NATO officials blame a “lack of consensus”. Western European countries, notably Germany and Italy, are against anything that is not first discussed with Russia. A likely outcome is a generic plan, to be presented privately to the Baltic three in December, that will not deal with specific threats.
Nobody really expects a military conflict. But if NATO even hints that it is no longer in the business of guaranteeing the defence of all its members, it may encourage Kremlin mischief-making over such issues as minority rights or transit to Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave. Eastern Europeans are also cross about the European Union’s recent carve-up of top jobs. Germany and France showed that they decide the EU’s foreign policy, and that easterners do not count, says one minister in the region.
The Americans admit to botching the announcement in September of a new missile-defence plan—upgraded, not cancelled, they now insist. Vice-President Joe Biden has visited America’s main central European allies, as well as Ukraine and Georgia, to dispel feelings of neglect. A formidable American warship toured the Baltic during the Russian exercises. Six senior generals have visited Latvia alone in the past 12 months; bilateral military exercises are planned next year. The administration has offered Poland exercises with Patriot missile batteries armed with live warheads, whereas previously it had offered only dummy drills.
Few people anywhere mourn the departure of George Bush and the strains he placed on America’s allies. But his team of hard-bitten officials who dealt with eastern Europe is still missed. The idealistic Mr Obama has brought a different lexicon to foreign policy: realpolitik is in, talk of common values is out. Some find this a refreshing change from the hectoring of the Bush administration. But eastern Europeans are distressed to hear so much talk of “partners” (bracketing countries as different as China and Poland) and so little of “allies”.
A further worry is the effect on NATO of the war in Afghanistan. The more that NATO’s success there is defined as crucial to the alliance’s credibility, the more eastern members fear the consequences if it fails. Proportionately, eastern European NATO members have helped most in Afghanistan. The American-backed security pledge at the heart of NATO matters most to them too. Western Europeans who privately see NATO as an anachronism are unbothered by American disengagement.
Admittedly, the Obama administration is preoccupied with domestic issues and with other pressing matters abroad. Europe as a whole, not just the eastern Europeans, cannot expect constant nannying. But even in Washington concern is mounting as well. “Why is the most popular man on the planet, leading the world’s strongest country, unable to get relations with America’s closest allies right?” fumes one (apolitical) former official.
Many explanations can be offered. Inexperience is one. European and American observers talk of disorganisation in the administration’s National Security Council. One European official speaks of a “black hole” there. Some note a tribal desire among Obamaites to be different from the Bushies: if they favoured eastern Europe, the new policy must be chillier. Others blame a habit of preferring a friendly atmosphere to tough decisions. “It is not irredeemable. But they have to redeem it,” says Kurt Volker, another former official.
Part of the problem is that the EU and NATO are so frustrating to deal with. The fault lies on both sides—but some of it reflects bad staff work that has made Mr Obama’s summits with the EU and NATO both boring and useless. Even where interests chime, progress is slow. A year after the EU first mooted its “eastern partnership” to boost western ties with six ex-Soviet countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), talks on American involvement are only just starting. A stronger Europe policy in Washington might make easterners less twitchy about America’s dealings with Russia.
Such worries have led Poland to push for a stronger bilateral security commitment from America. That is ambitious, but also risky. If it fails, it could heighten the sense of abandonment. If it succeeds, it could create a two-tier NATO in the east: a few countries with a direct relationship with America, and a vulnerable rump without. A senior Pole denies this is a danger, noting that Polish military plans already include defence of Lithuania. The stronger Poland is, the more it can protect its neighbours. “They are our West Berlin,” he says. Hardly a comforting thought.
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Ashton mk 2 |
Europe.view
Why the past matters
Dec 3rd 2009
From Economist.com
A defence of last week's column about Europe's new foreign minister
LAST week’s column on Lady Ashton’s appointment as the European Union’s high representative for foreign policy attracted a flurry of comments. Many were negative and some of them furious.
The criticism falls into two categories. Some readers see nothing wrong with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (for which the then Ms Ashton worked in the late 1970s and early 1980s). They see it as a noble (or at least well-intentioned) organisation, which attempts to rid the world of nuclear weapons—a cause, one might add, also backed by Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama. The fact that the Soviet Union supported some of CND’s goals is neither here nor there: ideas are not responsible for the people who believe in them. From this point of view, Lady Ashton has nothing to apologise for. To term past association with CND as in any way as culpable as having had some indirect ties to the apartheid regime in South Africa is a grotesque smear. That cause was basically evil whereas the “peace movement” was basically good.
A second group of readers believe that the past is simply irrelevant. CND may or may not have been a Soviet front. But at the time it was a cause which in its broad aims enjoyed support from many people and most of Britain’s Labour Party (including Tony Blair). Suggesting that Lady Ashton deserves particular opprobrium is mean-minded and unfair, and is probably part of a hidden agenda to discredit her in order to (insert favourite conspiracy theory here).
The smoke from straw men being incinerated risks clouding the debate. The column explicitly conceded that many people supported CND for rational and genuine motives. CND affiliation is quite unlike a past in, say, the pro-Soviet wing of the Communist Party of Great Britain. Some may find it uncomfortable when a moral giant like Vladimir Bukovsky says that western peace movements were financed and orchestrated by the Soviet Union, but he is a serious person and his allegation deserves a hearing. However, the column explicitly did not say that Lady Ashton had done anything wrong, or that she was a communist fellow-traveller.
The column did note the oddity that west Europeans tend to be a bit amnesiac about the horrors of communism and the culpability of people in the west who defended it (which at the time included at least some members of CND and the Labour Party). But they have lively memories and finely tuned moral reflexes when dealing with some other issues, especially ones that are safely long ago (such as slavery or colonialism) or involve enemies of unquestionable evil such as Nazi or apartheid regimes. That is a comfortable position, but not universally accepted or immune from criticism.
It was not west Europeans who were herded into cattle trucks to die of cold and hunger in Siberia. It was not west Europeans who had to choose between denouncing a colleague or seeing their own children denied education. It was not west Europeans who had to live in the stifling humiliating, backwardness and stagnation of the late communist era. It was not west Europeans who got shot if they tried to flee their own country.
Lady Ashton’s supporters may well feel that dragging up an innocent and unrelated episode in her past career is hurtful and unfair. But from many east Europeans’ point of view, the peace movement risked prolonging communist rule by weakening the west’s pressure on the evil empire. As the EU’s foreign-affairs chief, she has to represent them too. Simply denouncing as bigots those who mind about this issue will aggravate the concern, not dispel it.
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Ashton mk 1 |
Europe.view
Better red than dead?
Nov 26th 2009
From Economist.com
The peacenik past of the EU's new foreign minister deserves scrutiny
Holding her past to account
IMAGINE a British Conservative politician—call her Catriona Aston—coming from obscurity to gain one of the top posts in the European Union, just as Lady (Catherine) Ashton (pictured) has emerged from the Labour ranks to be the EU’s new foreign minister. Imagine that on closer scrutiny it turns out that in the early 1980s the fictional Ms Aston worked for a cold-war think-tank called something like the “African Freedom Foundation”, which campaigned against the spread of communism in Africa. Imagine that on closer examination it turns out that this outfit enjoyed strong behind-the-scenes support from the then apartheid government in South Africa. Among its supporters and officials are unrepentant defenders of the fascist regimes in Spain and Portugal and even those who said that Nazism had been a lesser evil than communism.
It is easy to imagine what would happen. The hapless Ms Aston would be publicly disgraced and would have to resign forthwith. How could an EU representative credibly deal with the developing countries when she in the past had been a defender of a racist colonial regime? Nuance, context and balance would go out of the window. Nobody would ask if all causes supported by the former South African regime were equally evil, or if communism had maybe cost more African lives than apartheid.
Against that hypothetical background, the lack of fuss about the real life Catherine Ashton’s involvement with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in the 1980s looks puzzling. Ms Ashton (as she was then) was a paid organiser for CND in the late 1970s and its treasurer from 1980-82.
It is worth remembering that CND was (and is) a legal organisation. It encompassed a wide range of views. Some supporters simply wanted Britain to get rid of its outdated and expensive “independent” nuclear deterrent. Others thought that the Reagan administration’s decision to put medium-range cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was mistaken. Some idealists believed that a strong peace movement in Western Europe would inspire those behind the Iron Curtain to demand disarmament from their rulers too. Some were outright pacifists; others argued that nuclear weapons were so dangerous that “better red than dead” was the only rational approach.
Yet the fact remains that the Kremlin found CND and other “peace movements” useful ways of undermining the unity of NATO, weakening the West’s defence posture and stoking anti-Americanism. The ex-dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, an expert in Soviet penetration of the West, says: “the worldwide disarmament campaign in the early 1980s was covertly orchestrated from Moscow. To a substantial extent it was also funded by the Soviet bloc”.
As CND’s treasurer, Ms Ashton argued publicly for the organisation to produce audited accounts, to counter allegations of covert Soviet support. That does not convince Mr Bukovsky. CND funding, and who knew what when, may merit further investigation.
The real scandal, though, is the West’s continuing amnesia about the cold war. Given the Soviet Union’s history of mass murder, subversion, and deceit, it is astonishing that even tangential association with Soviet-backed causes in the past does not arouse the moral outrage now that is still so readily evoked by connections with the (undisputedly revolting) regime in South Africa. Most CND veterans see their peacenik days, at worst, as romantic youthful idealism. Warm-hearted but soft-headed, maybe: but better than being cold-hearted and hard-headed.
That is a shameful cop-out. Imagine a 1980s Europe where CND had triumphed, with left-wing governments in Britain and Germany scrapping NATO, surrendering to Kremlin pressure and propping up the evil empire. Her opponents complain that Lady Ashton is ineffective. As a CND organiser, that may have been a blessing.
Friday, July 24, 2009
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Poland Czech and Lisbon |
Poles, Czechs and the Lisbon treaty
The awkward squad
Jul 23rd 2009 | PRAGUE AND WARSAW
From The Economist print edition
Why the Polish and Czech presidents drag their feet over the Lisbon treaty
AFP
Klaus and Kaczynski, procrastinating presidents
AFTER being subject to commissars in Moscow, some east Europeans are twitchy about commissioners in Brussels. But that only partly explains the reluctance of two presidents, Poland’s Lech Kaczynski and the Czech Republic’s Vaclav Klaus, to sign the European Union’s Lisbon treaty, which both countries’ parliaments have ratified.
Both men are famously prickly and prone to nit-picking. Both frame their objections in the language of national sovereignty. Both hate to see Ireland bullied—it is being asked to vote again on Lisbon on October 2nd. Mr Kaczynski similarly disliked the sanctions briefly imposed by the EU on Austria when the right-wing Freedom Party was in government. Mr Klaus says the EU elite cannot accept dissenting views (when visiting European parliamentarians attacked his Euroscepticism he compared them to communist-style thought police).
But the differences are bigger than the similarities. Mr Kaczynski’s opposition to Lisbon is about posturing not principle. He says publicly that he is merely waiting for the second Irish referendum before signing. Given that he helped to negotiate the treaty on Poland’s behalf, it would be hard for him to demonise it as Mr Klaus does. Indeed, Mr Kaczynski, who worries about waxing Russian influence and a waning American presence, has described the EU as “a great thing”.
The real reason for the Polish president’s delay is a desire to annoy the government led by Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform party. Mr Tusk defeated the government led by Law and Justice, headed by the president’s twin, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, in 2007. Mr Tusk’s emollient, pro-EU stance contrasts sharply with the Kaczynskis’ abrasive style. A delay over Lisbon also allows the president to grandstand on the EU’s “moral relativism” (meaning the incompatibility of its views of human rights with Polish social mores on homosexuality and the like).
Mr Klaus says he will get around to Lisbon only once everyone else has endorsed it. He will probably sign, but through gritted teeth. He would like a loose free-trade zone instead of what he sees as a nascent superstate. Unlike Mr Kaczynski, he is no Atlanticist; he gets on quite well with Russia. Also unlike Mr Kaczynski, he has the excuse that, though Lisbon passed the Czech parliament in May, it faces a court challenge by politicians from the Civic Democratic party that Mr Klaus once led.
Euroscepticism has only limited appeal in eastern Europe. The EU is widely seen as a guarantor of stability and progress: generous in paying for modernisation of public services and infrastructure and the best hope for fighting corruption. Lisbon is widely backed not on its merits but because its failure would risk pushing the EU into yet another interminable internal debate.
Friday, July 17, 2009
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Pipelines |
Energy in Europe
He who pays for the pipelines calls the tune
From The Economist print edition
Nabucco and other new gas pipelines may make Europe’s energy more secure, but market liberalisation matters too

TRAGEDY and farce have too often been the hallmarks of European efforts to improve energy security. Dependence on Russia, which supplied a third of its gas imports through Kremlin-controlled east-west pipelines, seemed to be rising inexorably and worryingly. Squabbling between Russia and Ukraine led to repeated supply cuts. The Russians exploited energy to divide and rule their Western neighbours. Big energy companies in countries such as Germany and Austria sought cosy relations with Russia’s state-controlled gas giant, Gazprom.
The overlap between politics and profit was epitomised by Gerhard Schröder, a former German chancellor. Since 2005 he has been the front man for Nord Stream, the pipeline that is planned to run under the Baltic. Along with South Stream, a sister project across the Black Sea, Nord Stream would let Russia bypass troublesome transit countries, chiefly Ukraine. West European customers could benefit, but the plans alarm countries in the east that are at greater risk of Russian bullying.
Now this gloomy picture is brightening. For a start, Europe has diversified its sources of supply: cost and unreliability have led Gazprom to lose a third of its European market to imports from Norway, Qatar and Trinidad, says Mikhail Korchemkin of East European Gas Analysis, a consultancy. Second, one of the European Union’s efforts to curb Russia’s transit monopoly is gaining traction. In a signing ceremony in Ankara on July 13th, the Nabucco pipeline, which will connect Europe to gas-rich Central Asia via the Balkans, Turkey and the Caucasus, won formal backing from the main transit countries: Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as from Germany.
This step reflects a €200m ($283m) dollop of EU money, plus some political shifts. Turkey had earlier bargained toughly (some said destructively). The EU’s quiet expression of interest earlier this year in White Stream, a rival project across the Black Sea, may have changed Turkish minds. And Nabucco has hired Joschka Fischer, a former German foreign minister, as a consultant (see article).
Nabucco could carry some 30 billion cubic metres of gas a year. But that is only a fifth of what Russia exports to Europe; and it will not be finished until at least 2015. Moreover, the sources of that gas remain unclear. Azerbaijan has enough only for the project’s early stages, though it is exploiting new offshore gasfields. Iran would be a logical supplier, but is out of the question on political grounds. A promising newcomer is Iraq’s Kurdish region. In May a Western-backed consortium unveiled an $8 billion plan to extract gas there and sell it to Nabucco. This week Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister, said he could supply half the gas the pipeline needed.
But the biggest prize would be gas from Turkmenistan, a Central Asian dictatorship that claims to sit atop one of the world’s largest gas reserves. The Turkmen leadership is hesitant about annoying the Kremlin, which now buys all of the country’s exports to make up for Russia’s own flagging gas production. But an EU-backed negotiating consortium has made some progress in talks with Turkmenistan. President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov recently announced that his country had a surplus of natural gas “available to foreign customers, including Nabucco”.
That would, however, require a new pipeline under the Caspian Sea, which would not only be costly and slow but also subject to objections from Russia and Iran (which would like to offer a land-based route instead). Russia is the only serious naval power in the Caspian. It showed in last August’s war with Georgia that it is prepared to use military force to protect its interests in the neighbourhood.
An American delegation, including Barack Obama’s national security adviser on the region, Michael McFaul, has just been to Turkmenistan to stress the importance the West puts on making Nabucco a success. American lobbying proved crucial to the success of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, which opened in 2005. Many thought that was a pipe dream in the beginning, but with strong political backing it came to acquire an aura of inevitability. Nabucco’s backers hope to repeat the BTC pipeline’s trick.
Other less ambitious pipelines are also moving ahead. ITGI, which aims to bring Azeri gas to Italy via Turkey and Greece, has just announced a deal to extend a spur north to Bulgaria, ending that country’s near-total reliance on Russian gas. Another EU-backed scheme, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, has signed up gas from Iran and expects to draw on Azerbaijan too.
Russia has not given up. Gazprom has just signed a $2.5 billion deal with Nigeria (it was named Nigaz, showing a refreshing ignorance of politically incorrect language). It is pressing on with the Opal pipeline to connect Nord Stream to an existing transit point on the German-Czech border. Germany, controversially, has given the scheme a 25-year monopoly. But other bits of the Kremlin’s energy diplomacy show patchy results. Attempts to build an international gas cartel have stalled. Plans for a push into liquefied natural gas look unrealistic. Most recently, a row with Turkmenistan has hit Russia’s gas imports.
Corruption, incompetence and state interference have long held back Russia’s gas industry. Production is falling. Russia has brought only one new gasfield on stream since the collapse of the Soviet Union and new reserves are in costly, distant regions. Even before the oil price fell (bringing down the gas price too), Gazprom had the highest costs and worst finances of any international gas company. With debts of over $40 billion, it will struggle to afford projects that make political sense, but cannot pay their way. That is how Nord Stream (cost up to €13 billion) and South Stream (€20 billion) increasingly look. Alan Riley, a British academic specialising in competition law, thinks both projects may also breach EU anti-monopoly rules.
That is a more serious threat as EU energy-market liberalisation takes hold. So far Germany, France and others have fought to protect national energy champions. But the European Commission wants more liberalisation and better interconnections. On July 8th it fined two energy giants, Germany’s E.ON and GDF Suez of France, €553m apiece for a market-sharing agreement involving Russian gas. It may yet look into whether Gazprom’s Opal monopoly and its contract bans on re-export of gas are legal. “The commission is trying to achieve through litigation what it couldn’t achieve through legislation,” says Pierre Noël, a French energy analyst at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Boring energy liberalisation may be a surer route to energy security than glamorous pipelines.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
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Europe view 137 |
WHEN the people who run the Western world go on holiday, bad things happen in eastern Europe. Last August Russia invaded Georgia. Over Christmas its gas spat with Ukraine left millions of European consumers shivering (from nerves, if not real cold). Easter (on the western Christian calendar) brought violent protests against ballot-rigging in Moldova. What upsets this summer may bring can only be guessed at. A new war in Georgia is always possible. Crimea remains a combustible mixture of incompatible military and ethnic interests. The Kremlin’s relations with the once-docile regime in Belarus are uncommonly icy. Your columnist will be keeping his BlackBerry fully charged and close by the poolside. The Russia monitor Whatever the summer crisis may be, it seems pretty clear that it will meet a crisper response from America than from the European Union. One example of that came this week when Barack Obama (presumably fairly busy with Iran, North Korea, health-care reform and other trifles) found time for an unscheduled meeting with Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the president of Estonia. That is partly a reward for the Estonians’ largely unsung service in Afghanistan (its soldiers get maimed and killed while most NATO warriors either stay away or shirk conflict). It also reflects the personal profile of the waspish and brainy Mr Ilves, America’s favourite east European politician. But it was also a coded message to Moscow: the “reset button” may be a useful gimmick to get talks going on issues such as nuclear weapons. But it does not represent any wavering in American support for the frontline states on NATO’s eastern border. America’s attention to detail contrasts with the rather feeble efforts that the European Union has been making in the region. An insightful new paper by the European Council on Foreign Relations (EFCR), a think-tank, shows how the EU is complacently frittering away its advantages and losing out to Russia in the countries of the new “Eastern Partnership”—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. On paper, the EU’s position should be invincible. It trades more with five of the six countries (Belarus is the exception) than Russia does. That is a big shift from the days when the Kremlin dominated the ex-Soviet economic space. The EU’s freedom and prosperity give it a lot of soft power too: even a distant prospect of membership counts for a lot more than the tangled embrace of Kremlin-run projects such as the still abortive Eurasian Economic Community or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Belarus has flounced away from an important CSTO summit meeting amid a bitter row about new Russian barriers to its food exports. Yet the Eastern Partnership is faring poorly. Launched by the crippled Czech presidency at the Prague summit last May, the new programme is struggling to make an impact. From the big EU countries, only Angela Merkel bothered to show up at its birth. And Germany was among the countries that insisted that the most vital ingredient in the package—liberalisation of visas—was diluted almost to the point of meaninglessness. The paper’s authors argue that while the EU fiddles on the sidelines, the six countries remain badly run, stricken by economic downturns, and under constant pressure from Russia. To take just one example, Russian media, particularly television, is hugely popular, and strongly pushes the Kremlin world view. European media, by contrast, make a negligible impact. When crises erupt, the EU’s response is belated and feeble. The ECFR wants the EU to appoint high-level envoys with real clout to spend serious time and energy dealing with the region. When they are not on their holidays, that is.
Europe.view
Summertime blues
From Economist.com
Will warm weather stiffen European spines?Shutterstock 
Friday, June 12, 2009
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CEE Euro-election results |
Scary elections in eastern Europe
Time to start fretting
Jun 11th 2009
From The Economist print edition
Boring centre-right parties did well—but so did quite a few nasties
INTEPRETERS in the European Parliament trying to translate the remarks of George “Gigi” Becali may struggle. Even in his native Romanian, his puzzling syntax and coarse slang make him a butt of satirists. The interpreters may also blench at what he says, especially about Jews, gays, Roma (Gypsies) and women. But they may be spared this for the time being because a court has banned the newly elected Mr Becali from leaving Romania pending a criminal trial for kidnapping.
Xenophobes and populists have been elected in old European Union members such as the Netherlands too. But their east European counterparts make the westerners seem tame. Mr Becali’s fellow victor on the Greater Romania list is Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a vituperative nationalist who was once court poet to Nicolae Ceausescu, the former Communist dictator.
Yet international co-operation among politicians who hate foreigners is inherently tricky. Hungary’s far-right Jobbik party, which won three seats, may join its Balkan counterparts (including two members of Bulgaria’s explicitly racist Ataka party) in Roma-bashing. But they will have little in common when it comes to minority rights for Hungarians in neighbouring countries such as Slovakia and Romania, where Magyar irredentism is a convenient bogeyman for local chauvinists.
There were shocks at the far-left end of the spectrum too. One winner in Latvia was Alfreds Rubiks, a hardline former Communist who was jailed for backing a Kremlin-inspired coup against Latvian independence in 1991. Most Latvians see him as a pariah. His victory highlights the ominous rise of Soviet nostalgia among the country’s increasingly alienated Russians. In Estonia, by contrast, ethnic Russian parties flopped. The soft-left Centre Party got their votes, and more besides. The most striking Estonian result was the election of Indrek Tarand, a popular ex-diplomat who ran as an independent to protest against rules stopping voters from choosing among candidates on party lists.
As in western Europe, the main stories in the east were thumping wins by centre-right parties. Poland’s ruling Civic Platform did strikingly well, with 25 seats to 15 for the main opposition, the more populist Law and Justice party. In the Czech Republic the centre-right Civic Democrats won nine of the 22 seats, against seven for the Social Democrats and four for the Communists. In Hungary the ruling Socialists (ex-communists) did very badly, with only four seats to 14 for the conservative Fidesz party. That augurs well for the right in next year’s general election.
The exception was Slovakia, where the ruling centre-left Smer (Direction) party led by the prime minister, Robert Fico, did well on a paltry 19.6 % turnout, the lowest in the EU. His party won five out of 13 seats, with the fragmented conservative opposition polling poorly, as did two nationalist fringe parties in the coalition government. Both had featured in a string of recent corruption scandals.
The real significance of the elections may lie less in the composition of the new European Parliament than in pointers to the future course of national politics. Mr Fico, for example, will need to find new allies after next year’s general election if his present coalition partners continue to flop. Poland’s Civic Platform is on track to win the presidency next year.
Scandal-strewn Bulgaria is holding a parliamentary election on July 5th. If the European contest is any guide, the vote should be lively but nasty. Mafia-linked parties did alarmingly well in the European poll, though they did not win any seats. Vote-buying was common, as were other lurches towards rule-bending and ballot-rigging. In what looks like a blatant attempt to penalise minor parties, the authorities tried (but failed) to raise the election threshold to 8%, the highest in Europe. Legal chicanery meant that an opposition coalition had great difficulty even registering. Sadly, EU officials monitoring Bulgaria’s shaky progress towards clean government will have plenty to put in their next report. It is bad enough when dodgy characters win votes, but even worse when they count them.
Thursday, April 30, 2009
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EU Cybersecurity (Europe View no 130) |
Batten down the cyber-hatches
Apr 30th 2009
From Economist.com
Securing vulnerable networks across Europe
OVER the past ten years the European Union has failed to protect the continent’s energy security. Will it do any better when it comes to cyber-security?
At an EU conference on that subject in Tallinn on April 27th, participants wrestled with the need to act and the difficulty of deciding what exactly to do. The location was a suitable one: Estonia is the only EU member state to have suffered a full-scale cyber-attack, in April 2007. Amid a furious row with Russia about the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial, a flood of bogus internet traffic disabled the country’s main websites, briefly shutting down vital public services and crippling businesses such as online banking.
Yet two years later, the EU and its member states are still wrestling with the issue. Knowing whether such attacks come from pranksters, hooligans, terrorists, criminals or an unfriendly government is difficult—sometimes impossible. But the potential damage is clear: everything from water and electric power to financial industries and retail distribution depends on the internet. The right combination of malicious code, stolen or hacked passwords and a badly designed system could mean catastrophe.
One temptation is to put lots of faith in expensive and gimmicky technical fixes. But as Scott Borg, an American expert attending the conference, pointed out, the starting point should be economics: without knowing the cost of, say, a 24-hour power shutdown as opposed to a six-hour one, it is hard to know what priority to give the means necessary to prevent it.
A simple form of defence is sharing information. But that requires trust. If news of a cyberstrike on a business leaks out, it can scare customers and send share prices plummeting. The last thing that business will want to do is announce that it has been attacked. Yet pooling knowledge strengthens everyone’s defences. Similarly, getting businesses and bureaucrats to share information runs into cultural barriers, as well as worries about confidentiality and legal liability.
So it is no surprise that countries with a high level of social trust are way ahead of the rest. Sweden, for example, will be staging its third bi-annual cyber-warfare exercise on May 6th and 7th, in which officials and businesses will practise coping with simulated attacks, some using live “ammunition”, and work out how they would keep the economy and public services going most effectively. Most EU member states are nowhere near that level. Some have yet to set up a national body, usually known as a computer emergency readiness team or CERT, to coordinate cyber-defences.
That makes a provisional plan to hold EU-wide cyberwar exercises by 2010 look ambitious. So is placing great hopes on a common regulatory framework to deal with cyber-security, for example setting clearer rules about identity on the internet. It is hard to imagine the “black hats” (the generic term for the bad guys) quaking at the thought of yet another fat document emerging from the Brussels bureaucracy.
One contentious idea discussed at the conference was whether to make internet service providers (ISPs) legally liable, at least to some extent, for the damage caused by the data they transmit. That might encourage them to police and protect their customers better. But given the scale of the potential risk, it is hard to see how any ISP could cope.
The best hope is that countries with the best cyber-defences keep innovating and coordinating their efforts, and that over time more states will join them. By most counts, they number roughly seven European countries, including non-EU Norway. For everyone else, some prudent supplies of bottled water, canned food and candles sounds sensible.
Thursday, April 09, 2009
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Moldova latest from Economist website |
THE poorest country in Europe is used to being neglected by the rest of the world. But protests against vote rigging in elections held on Sunday April 5th brought Moldova some attention this week. In the past few days youthful demonstrators, who were organised via Twitter and other social-networking sites, stormed parliament and the presidential offices in the capital city, Chisinau. Some threw rocks, broke windows and started fires. As the police belatedly tried to restore order, scores were injured and one person died. Nearly 200 people had been arrested by Wednesday. Amid allegations of foreign mischief-making, Moldova expelled the Romanian ambassador. The immediate issue is the election result, in which the ruling Communists won a majority in the single-chamber parliament. The election was declared fair by outside monitors, who assessed what happened on the day, but the composition of electoral registers looks dodgy, as does the overwhelming support that the Communists enjoyed from the main media. The protesters are loosely tied to established opposition parties. They are cross about the election and even more annoyed by the outgoing president, Vladimir Voronin. Mr Voronin has stated that, although he would step down in accordance with the constitution’s term limit, he would stay in politics as a “Moldovan Deng Xiaoping”. That seemed to suggest no change from the economic and strategic failures of the past two decades, which have seen Moldova’s 4m population languish in a geopolitical limbo between Russia and the European Union. Most Moldovans favour Europe but the political elite, mainly Soviet-trained and Russian-speaking, has found it hard to break old ties and habits. Mr Voronin has wobbled in both directions. Of late he has seemed to favour ties with Moscow, chiefly because a deal with the Kremlin seems to offer the only hope of solving the frozen conflict with the self-declared state of Transdniestria. This densely populated and industrialised sliver of land on the eastern bank of the Dniester river has maintained an unrecognised independence since a brief civil war that finished with Russian intervention in 1992. Western attempts to resolve that debilitating impasse have got nowhere, whereas Russia has kept up a stream of initiatives. With decent leadership and goodwill on all sides, it would be possible to have friendly relations with both Russia and the EU. But Moldova’s leaders have ended up with the worst of both worlds, ignored by the EU and bamboozled by Russia. The most divisive question is relations with Romania. The Moldovan Soviet republic, which gained independence in 1991, was carved out of pre-war Romania in 1940, as a consequence of the Hitler-Stalin pact; Transdniestria, always in Russian hands, was bolted on. Nico Popescu, of the European Council of Foreign Relations, says that demands for closer ties with Romania have strengthened in recent years, as that country’s EU membership has contrasted ever more sharply with Moldova’s status as a “semi-failed state”. As well as EU flags, some protesters this week carried Romanian ones. That has infuriated the Moldovan authorities. They find it much easier to fight the bogeyman of Romanian revanchism and chauvinism than defend their own dismal record in office. Andrei Popov, of the Foreign Policy Association, a Moldova-based think-tank, believes that the authorities may even be exaggerating the pro-Romanian element in the protests in order to discredit the opposition’s wider political demands. There is little evidence that Romania has made a big effort to undermine Moldova. Romanian politicians, notably the president, Traian Basescu, have made grandiloquent and tactless statements. The mutual detestation between him and Mr Voronin is legendary. One practical Romanian policy has proved controversial: allowing Moldovans with roots in the pre-war Romanian state to apply for passports. The political upheavals cry out for attention from the EU, which has failed to get to grips with Moldova’s ills. As with Ukraine’s orange revolution five years ago, it may take a heavyweight outsider to get talks going between entrenched but discredited authorities and an enthusiastic but incoherent opposition. If Europe cannot solve Moldova’s problems, it is hard to see much future for the trumpeted “Eastern Partnership” which is meant to reinvigorate EU policies towards the six ex-Soviet countries on its eastern borders.
Protests in Moldova
Moldova burning
From Economist.com
Violent protests erupt against the government of Moldova
Thursday, December 18, 2008
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Europe view--change the Euro rules |
Europe.view
Time to change the rules
Dec 18th 2008
From Economist.com
The EU is asking too much of the ex-communist states that want to join the euro
MOST people who give the matter any thought agree: one of the main rules for countries wanting to join the euro is perverse. Yet adopting the common currency has gone from seeming a matter of national pride to national necessity, as the financial turmoil has highlighted the costs and risks that small countries face by keeping their national currencies. For places like the Baltic states and Bulgaria (which already peg their currencies to the euro) maintaining the current regime carries extra burdens and no benefits.
But euro-adopters must meet a European Union (EU) rule that stipulates a “high degree of price stability”, meaning that inflation must be no more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the three best-performing countries. (The other rules are less controversial. The second is sound public finances, meaning a government deficit below 3% of GDP and government debt below 60%. The third is stable exchange rates and the fourth is low long-term interest rates.)
The inflation rule is arbitrary in the sense that the benchmark is not the performance of the three best-performing (ie, lowest-inflation) countries actually in the euro zone, but rather the best three in the entire EU. So to join the euro, you might have to lower your inflation to the level of three countries that don’t use the common currency (eg Britain, Sweden and Denmark).
It is also harsh: as poor countries (such as the ex-communist states of eastern Europe) get richer, they should enjoy an appreciating exchange rate if their currency floats. But if they have their currency pegged, then it can’t appreciate. So prices and wages measured in the local currency will rise instead (economists call that the Balassa-Samuelson effect). That is not inflation of the kind that the euro zone’s managers should mind about.
Thirdly, the risk now is that the three benchmark countries may be suffering deflation. That is a nasty state of affairs which most countries would do much to avoid (because it leads consumers to postpone consumption while they they expect prices to fall further, thus triggering a long slump). It would be truly bizarre if countries battling for survival were to force deflation on themselves willingly.
So what to do? Andrus Ansip, Estonia’s commendably blunt prime minister, recently questioned the value of the current approach. But the European Central Bank and the EU’s monetary minders are not in the mood for treaty-tweaking. A better idea would be for the non-euro countries in the EU (ie, all the ex-communist ones bar Slovenia and Slovakia—plus Britain, Sweden and Denmark) to get together and warn the ECB that they will support any member that adopts the euro unilaterally. Then Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, for example, could euro-ise on their own. Countries with currency boards and similar arrangements can do that almost at will: the money in circulation is covered by the central bank’s reserves, so you just substitute one for another.
That would turn the tables on the gnomes of Frankfurt. But it requires leadership. Only with one or more big countries—preferably Poland and Sweden—giving the small countries political cover will they have the nerve to take a step like this. The ECB could complain loudly, while privately accommodating the change. Then it would say that it had to change the rules to reflect the fait accompli.
This would not solve the underlying problems of the euro zone. Nor would it cure the ex-communist countries’ economic hangovers, which are the result of reckless borrowing and slow reforms. But it would at least remove the risk that some of the most vulnerable countries in Europe’s east suffer needless harm—at a time when the rich half of the continent is ill-placed to help them.
Friday, November 21, 2008
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Europe View #106 |
Cleaning up the act
Nov 20th 2008
The EU’s watchdogs stand in need of better watching
The European Union’s thinking about corruption goes roughly like this. It is a problem for governments, chiefly in the new member states. The best way to fight it is by making entry into the EU conditional on progress. That will create the political will which must, sooner or later, bring results.
That approach is not working. Anti-corruption efforts have stalled or reversed. Countries such as the Slovenia, Romania, Latvia and the Czech Republic have closed down or weakened their anti-corruption offices. Efforts by the two newest members, Romania and Bulgaria, are ineffective. Croatia, though gripped by a ghastly outbreak of gangland violence, is moving swiftly towards the EU.
The real story is that the prospect of EU membership encourages elites to pay lip service to the anti-corruption cause, but no more than that. Once the conditionality is gone, the pressure stops.
Efforts to train officials and create the right sort of structures in ex-communist countries seem to have little or no effect. In a phrase familiar from western development efforts in non-European countries, “the solution is the problem”: in other words, the agencies and officials being entrusted with the means to fight corruption are just as bad (weak, corrupt or incompetent) as the people that they are supposed to be policing.
Those who do try to change things risk being fired, not promoted. Corruption-fighters such as Romania’s Daniel Morar or Slovenia’s Drago Kos are relying increasingly on support from outside to hang on to their jobs.
Awareness campaigns are not the answer: the public is already highly aware of the level of corruption, having first-hand experience of it. Such campaigns stoke a sense of futility: Eurobarometer opinion surveys show that easterners are increasingly disillusioned with the ethical standards of their elected representatives and public servants; west Europeans are morose about the same public officials as well as the impact of corruption on the EU as a whole.
These gloomy ideas—as they came to light in a “lessons learned” workshop at the recent International Anti-corruption Conference in Athens—should give EU decision-makers cause for serious thought. One of the organisers, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, of Berlin’s Hertie School, argues that in some new and future member states corruption is not seen as “a mostly individual infringement of a norm of government fairness and impartiality” but as the opposite: the normal way of distributing public services; to friends, allies, clients and bosses. Using judicial punishments against something that is largely regarded as normal behaviour (at least among the perpetrators) is unlikely to work. Nor are outside watchdogs such as OLAF, the EU’s in-house fraud-busting outfit, likely to get to grips with the problem, given their assumptions of “perfect functioning of the rule of law and of impartial bureaucracy”.
One answer is to set up a much better means of measuring anti-corruption efforts. The existing benchmarks focus on the creation of formal institutions, not on their impact. They also create an unhelpful mixture of smugness in some countries (“What us, corrupt? No way—try next door!”) and paranoia in others (“Why pick on us? What about them? And you?”). It would be good if new yardsticks included all the EU members, not just the new and future ones.
Perhaps the EU needs a commissioner for anti-corruption, or a special envoy, to be directly responsible for following up on commitments made during the enlargement process.
But the best approach is to use the expertise that can be found outside government, particularly in the voluntary sector. The enemy of corruption is public-spiritedness; the stronger that gets, the greater the chances of both constraint and redress. It is as simple—and as complicated—as that.
Thursday, October 30, 2008
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europe view |
Europe.view
Business as usual—no thanks
Oct 30th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Showing Russia a bit of spine now might save Europe serious pain in future
AP
AP
After Georgia, supposedly, everything was different. Europe had woken up to the reality of the ex-KGB regime in Russia, its repression at home, aggression abroad, and use of divide-and-rule tactics in the European Union and NATO. So goodbye to delusion, distraction and division, hello to unity and resolve. In short, no more business as usual.
That seems a long time ago. The mood in the EU is now rather different. Fault in the Georgian war fell on both sides. If Russia overreacted, it was only because Mikheil Saakashvili provoked it. Russia is stricken by the financial crisis now, and therefore not much of a threat. The priority has shifted to keeping the economies of Europe, old and new, afloat. It is no time to be picking fights with the Kremlin, especially over lost causes. So business as usual it is.
Usual or not, the business in question is almost comically irrelevant. At issue is not freezing bank accounts or prosecuting Kremlin cronies for money laundering. It is merely whether to start talks on a new partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia. The Kremlin has already said it doesn’t care much about this. The existing agreement is outdated, but rolls over each year without causing difficulty. The main effect of talks on a new PCA will be a lot more meetings, with lots of chances for “hardliners” (or sensibly hard-headed countries, depending on what you think of them) to block things they don’t like.
All the same, for some such countries, it seems far too soon to be letting the Kremlin off the hook. Suspending the PCA was a pretty meaningless sanction, but it was something to which the EU agreed as a way of enforcing what were at the time judged to be important conditions for peace and justice in Georgia. Russia has met some of its commitments—but not all. Ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two separatist enclaves now occupied fully by Russian troops, has been atrocious. Russia has not pulled back its forces to the levels they were at before “8-8-8” (as pro-Georgians have termed August 8th, echoing the use of “9/11” to mark the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001). Mr Saakashvili certainly has his faults—but he is coming under tough pressure at home from domestic challengers. That cannot be said about Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia.
From this point of view, backing down on the PCA will send a dangerous signal to the Kremlin that the EU does not have the willpower to stand up to foreign adventurism.
Countries that think this way are certainly in the minority. Sweden, once hawkish, is softening as its presidency of the EU in 2009 draws near. Britain is wobbly. The Baltic states fear being isolated. The best they can hope for is to insist that the EU also do something more for countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This idea, which has Czech, Polish and Swedish roots, is dubbed the “Eastern Partnership”. For now, it exists only on paper. Some money and political commitment would beef it up.
Insisting on even these minimum conditions may look like a lost cause. The “business as usual” camp (ie, most big European countries) are growling that being obstinate on these issues infuriates your friends and doesn’t damage your enemies. But history suggests the opposite. Lithuania, for example, fought a hard and lonely battle earlier this year to get the EU to pay more attention to Georgia and other issues that concern Russian bullying. Perhaps it was a bit clumsy, but in retrospect, it looks right and rather brave. Had Europe listened and acted then, it might have avoided a war—and a humiliation.
Friday, September 12, 2008
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Thoughts on Friedman (Europe View no 98) |
The weakness of the West
Sep 11th 2008
From Economist.com
Russia is on the front foot now—but not for ever
EVEN the most sanguine political observers would concede that dealing with a resurgent Russia may require a bit of a rethink. But George Friedman, the founder of Stratfor, a consultancy sometimes dubbed the “shadow CIA”, has floated a starker idea. In the latest New York Review of Books, he contends that the recent war between Russia and Georgia shows that the balance of power in Eurasia has already shifted—and sharply against the West.
His argument goes as follows. Vladimir Putin wanted both to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force and to show that Western security relationships mean nothing in the face of Russian power. The first was a close call (only hasty reinforcements allowed a victory over the Georgian army). But the second has been successful. Humiliating a close American ally has revealed the West’s weakness. The lesson of the war, writes Mr Friedman, is that “while the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value.”
Moreover, American denunciations of the attack on Georgia have played into Russia’s hands, by contrasting bombastic rhetoric with empty actions. Does America really want Russia to sell modern air-defence systems to Iran and Syria, endangering Israel’s ability to defend itself? If not, America had better forget Georgia. Europe barely rates a mention, with almost no military expeditionary capability and growing gas dependency on Russia.
In short, Mr Friedman concludes, Russia has “backed America into a corner”. Every country in the region is now re-evaluating its links with Moscow. Russia is using the window of opportunity created by Iraq and Afghanistan to assert a “new reality”.
Is that right? Mr Friedman’s argument is lucid, but incomplete. The West still sells one thing that is not made in Russia: respectability. That matters to the class that Andrei Piontkovsky, a Russian commentator, calls “global kleptocrats”. They want their businesses audited, lawyered and banked by blue-chip Western respectability-merchants. Dubai, Mumbai and Shanghai may offer that eventually, but not yet. Restricting the sale of respectability while the West still has some in stock would be a powerful sanction.
The best route is to start off with sanctions against any business or individual doing business in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. That will establish scrutiny mechanisms (such as visa denials and financial blacklists) that can then be applied more broadly once they are running smoothly.
Secondly, the West still has soft power. The Russian consulate in New York is not besieged by Americans wanting to emigrate. Large numbers of Russians, especially middle-class ones, have that option under active consideration. The Kremlin propaganda machine may be doing a good job in persuading the public that Russia is in the right and even that living conditions are improving. But it has not succeeded in persuading the public that life in Russia is good. And how could it? Corruption is rampant, infrastructure crumbling, public services disgraceful. The West can do a better job of highlighting that.
Thirdly, Europe does count. Russia may be able to use its relationship with countries such as Italy and Germany to veto use of the sticks, but it cannot stop Europe offering some juicy carrots to the countries now being squeezed by Russia. Places like Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are admittedly hard to help, but the task is not impossible.
In short, it is not (quite) as bad as Mr Friedman argues. The Russian geopolitical counterattack may falter because of internal divisions within the squabbling Kremlin elite. If not, it will prove self-limiting: the more it succeeds, the more opposition it arouses. But expect a nasty few months or years in the meantime.
Tuesday, September 09, 2008
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Russia-Georgia-France (from Economist.com) |
Russia and the West
A deal, for now
Sep 9th 2008
From Economist.com
Europe shores up the Russian-Georgian ceasefire agreement
HUMILIATION avoided, but hardly a triumph: that is the upshot of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s talks in Moscow on Monday September 9th, where he tried to get the Kremlin to implement in full a French-brokered ceasefire that ended Russia’s war with Georgia.
After sometimes stormy talks, Mr Sarkozy, accompanied by the European Union’s nominal foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana, and the EU commission’s president, José Manuel Barroso, gained agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from a buffer zone established around the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia (but so far almost nobody else) has recognised both places as independent states.
Russian forces will leave positions around the port of Poti within a week, and pull back from the rest of the buffer zone ten days after EU monitors are deployed, which must be by October 1st. Yet that is pretty much what Mr Sarkozy thought he had gained in the first ceasefire agreement, which envisaged (at least in Western eyes) troops from both sides moving back promptly to their pre-conflict positions.
Mr Sarkozy said that the deal, if honoured, would allow the resumption, presumably in October, of talks between the EU and Russia on a new partnership agreement. The decision of an emergency European summit was to suspend these talks amid unprecedented displeasure with Russia for its invasion of Georgia and recognition of the breakaway regions.
Yet the coming weeks offer plenty of scope for quibbling and foot-dragging. Russia has repeatedly accused Georgia of breaking the ceasefire agreement: that could be one pretext. Another could be any signs of American help to rebuild the shattered remnants of the Georgian army—which the Kremlin refers to hyperbolically as “Georgia’s military machine”. Russia also wants the Georgian leadership to sign a binding agreement renouncing the use of force to recover the lost territories. The EU says it will guarantee this. It also wants Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president, to stand trial for war crimes. It is unclear whether a 200-strong EU force will be able to patrol inside the breakaway regions.
Blame for the muddle rests partly with France, currently in charge of the EU. Mr Sarkozy allowed two different versions of the vaguely worded ceasefire agreement to circulate, with ambiguous translations on a key issue: whether Russia is allowed to provide security “in” the breakaway regions, or “for” them.
The latest agreement also allows Russia to maintain many more troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia than before the conflict. Western diplomats say that insisting on a reduction to pre-war levels is unrealistic. None of that is much comfort for the Georgian leadership, which is coping with tens of thousands of refugees and a nose-diving economy. Russian pressure for his departure may have shored up Mr Saakashvili’s position for now, but behind the scenes Georgian politicians are manoeuvring to replace him.
The worst east-west row for more than two decades may have stopped hotting up, but it is not cooling off much. Russia is sending a flotilla headed by one of its largest warships, Peter the Great, a nuclear-powered cruiser, to the Caribbean for joint manoeuvres with Venezuela, America’s most pungent adversary in the region. That follows the deployment of a handful of American naval ships to deliver humanitarian aid to Georgia. America has suspended a deal with Russia that would have allowed companies from both countries to invest in each other’s nuclear industry.
Russia may be betting that Europe and America cannot stay focused on Georgia for long. Russian help is needed on a range of other global issues, from Afghanistan to Iran. The EU and NATO are both deeply divided on Russia, with countries such as Italy loudly opposing sanctions of any kind, and others such as Germany highly mindful of Russia’s role as an energy supplier. A more hawkish camp, including Britain, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states, want a fundamental rethink of relations with Russia. But even proponents of that admit that the costs will be high, and the benefits distant.
Friday, September 05, 2008
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James Sherr |
Talks to The Economist audio (ie me) here
Saturday, August 30, 2008
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Daily Telegraph: Putin's pipeline to power |
Russia is fighting a new Cold War with banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes
By Edward Lucas
In classical mythology, Georgia was the land where the Argonauts had to harness bulls with bronze hooves to win the Golden Fleece. Modern Georgia is the source of a treasure scarcely less precious: oil and gas from central Asia and the Caspian, piped along the only east-west energy corridor that Russia does not control. But whereas Jason and his comrades triumphed, our quest has ended in humiliating failure.
As the occupying power in Georgia, Russia can close or destroy those pipelines whenever it wishes. The only country in the region that even came close to sharing Western values, one vital for our energy security, has been humiliatingly defeated and dismembered.
As politicians and voters in the free world return from their holidays, two big questions require answering. What happens next? And how do we stop it?
Decoding the Kremlin’s precise intentions is as tricky now as it was in the days of Kremlinology – a discipline as archaic as Morse code. But the outlines are clear.
Russia wants to recreate a “lite” version of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe and to neutralise the rest of the continent. Unlike the old Cold War, military action is a last resort: for the most part, it is banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes, that are doing the dirty work.
This may sound strange, given what has happened in Georgia. But it is vital to realise that this was not the beginning of a new Russian push, but part of something that began in the mid-1990s.
Russia has nobbled Belarus – the only other country, apart from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, that is ready to recognise the new statelets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It props up the narco-state of Tajikistan, cossets the dictatorship in Uzbekistan and woos the benighted despots of Turkmenistan. It has a cautious alliance with China, in the form of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, an outfit dedicated to fighting “extremism, terrorism and separatism” (although this last “-ism” has evidently been forgotten when it comes to Georgia).
It has stitched up energy deals in North Africa; it flirts with Iran and sells weapons to Hugo Chavez, the America-hating windbag who runs Venezuela. And by using energy diplomacy and divide-and-rule tactics, it is stitching up Europe country by country, from Cyprus to the Netherlands.
And it works. Over the crisis in Georgia, Europe has shown astonishing softness. The leaders of the EU have been all but invisible.
Where is the supposed foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana? Or the foreign-affairs commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner? Meanwhile, Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, has been humiliated by the blatant Russian breaches of the ceasefire agreement that he negotiated. Europe’s weakness is the result of multiple forms of soft-headedness and short-sightedness.
Partly it is simple anti-Americanism: if Vladimir Putin is making life difficult for George Bush, he must be a good guy. That attitude lies behind the astonishing opinion polls in countries such as Germany, which show that people have more trust in xenophobic, authoritarian Russia than they do in the world’s most powerful democracy.
There is also a mistaken belief that Russia is an ally in the struggle against globalisation: here is a country, argue intellectuals such as the British historian Correlli Barnett, that does not let itself be pushed around by multinational companies and the meddling do-gooders of the self-appointed “international community”.
But this is to misunderstand Russia under its kleptocratic and chauvinist ex-KGB rulers. Russia likes multilateral organisations, so long as it dominates them. It runs a whole bunch: for example, the “Commonwealth of Independent States”, which it is using to legitimise its occupation of Georgia.
Russia is also advocating a new pan-European security organisation, with formal legal status. This, it hopes, will exclude the United States, and tie up the West in the knots of international law, so that military intervention of the kind seen in the former Yugoslavia becomes all but impossible.
Similarly, although the Kremlin makes life difficult domestically for Western oil companies and tightly restricts foreign investment in any industry that it dubs “strategic” (which potentially covers almost anything), it is another story abroad. Russia delights in the possibilities of the global economy. If regulators in New York are sniffy about listing stolen companies on the stock exchange, there is always London. And if you fail even London’s undemanding test, Dubai, Bombay and Shanghai await with open arms.
Russia also uses its colossal war chest, fuelled by oil and gas revenues, to buy up assets in other countries. And that is the taproot of European softness: money.
In the Cold War, doing business with the Soviet Union was a rare and suspicious activity. Now Russia has penetrated our markets and businesses to a huge degree. Energy companies such as Austria’s OMV, Germany’s E.ON and Italy’s ENI work hand-in-glove with outfits such as Gazprom, which is nominally Russia’s biggest company, but better described as the gas division of Kremlin, Inc.
This directly affects politics. Germany, with Russia, is building the Nord Stream gas pipeline along the Baltic seabed to bypass Poland. Russia has already cut off energy supplies to punish Lithuania, the Czech Republic and other countries. When Nord Stream is built, it will be able to do the same to Poland.
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Yet even now, after a clear and brutal demonstration of Russian imperialism, Germany refuses to consider cancelling the pipeline. Angela Merkel was willing to pay a high-profile visit to the Baltic states – a likely target for Russia’s next push westwards – to offer support. But she would not even contemplate ending her energy alliance with Russia.
And it is hard to see this changing: European consumers will not pay hugely higher energy prices to finance alternative supplies, nor will politicians give the EU the weight it needs to bargain properly with Russia (a country, don’t forget, that is three times smaller in population than the EU, with an economy roughly a tenth of the size).
With the EU and Nato hopelessly divided, Russia can dismiss our toothless whimpers about Georgia. That leaves Eastern Europe to base its security on the United States.
Yet even America’s willingness to confront Russia is limited. Every incoming president since Bill Clinton has criticised his predecessor for being soft on Russia. But none has proved any better. For all John McCain’s fighting talk, and Barack Obama’s belated belligerence, neither man will be able to take a hard line. America needs Russia – for nuclear security, to hold back Iran, to contain North Korea, as a supply route to Afghanistan, in hunting down terrorists. And Russia knows it. If the mood in Washington is frosty, the Kremlin need only flirt more intensively with Iran, Venezuela and China, or withhold co-operation on some pressing topic, and America will buckle.
On top of all that, Russia’s leaders have a massively secure position at home. Their central bank has nearly $600 billion in hard-currency reserves, while their popularity is far greater than the Politburo ever dreamed of. Mr Putin, and the war in Georgia, are acclaimed – a view stoked by the docile media, which portrayed the conflict as a valiant crusade against genocide and Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili as a murderous fascist.
Abroad, Russia senses that power in the world is shifting east and south, to countries such as India and China, which see Georgia very differently. They may not much like separatism, but they also think that the West is practising double standards: America would not tolerate the Kremlin’s meddling in its backyard, so why should Russia have to put up with an America protégé in the Caucasus?
The German philosopher GF Hegel wrote that the owl of Minerva spreads her wings only at dusk: we perceive historical changes only when they are almost complete. We have enjoyed an extraordinary 20-year period in which Russia was weak and seemingly benign. Europe became (mostly) whole and free.
The idea that the continent could again become a battleground between East and West is unwelcome, and to many still inconceivable. But it is happening: and our resurgent enemy seemingly holds most of the cards.
There is, however, one chink of light, for us if not for the Russians. In the long term, the Putin regime means catastrophe for his country. The political system is opaque and fossilised, unable to respond to the needs of a changing economy or to rein in corruption, let alone deal with the fast-growing Muslim population, which has soared to 25 million – a 40 per cent rise since 1989 – as the birthrate among the Slavs has plunged. Modernisation of public services and infrastructure, in a country awash with money, has been dismally slow.
Foreign adventures are the traditional way for autocratic rulers to distract public opinion from problems at home, and Russia is no exception. The regime running Russia will come unstuck in the end. But the cost in the meantime will be dreadful.
Thursday, August 07, 2008
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Europe View no 93: more on Morar |
Europe.view
Corruption for and against
Aug 7th 2008
From Economist.com
Why Daniel Morar deserves the West’s support
CORRUPTION in Romania is a hot topic as the government decides whether to renew the mandate of the prosecutor-general, Daniel Morar. His supporters see him as a valiant scourge of high-level corruption; his opponents think he is an incompetent stooge pursuing political vendettas. These are the five common—but flawed—arguments against him.
First: the West is no better and its criticisms are hypocritical. Certainly since the collapse of communism the ethical underpinnings of the western system have steadily crumbled. The Europe of Gerhard Schröder and Silvio Berlusconi has little authority to condemn anybody.
But the worst features of old Europe should hardly be a model for anyone. Italy’s economy is in a terrible mess; Germany has been nobbled by Russia. And Romania, as a much poorer country, cannot afford bad government. It has a once-in-a-lifetime chance to catch up the lost decades of communist rule and that depends largely on billions of euros from the taxpayers of the richer part of the continent. Corruption endangers that.
The second argument is that Mr Morar has made no difference. Corruption is just as bad as it always was. Again, there is a grain of truth in that. Bribery in schools, clinics and the like is endemic. But to be fair, dealing with that is not Mr Morar’s job: his prosecutors are supposed to go after high-level corruption, not day-to-day sleaze. His lack of results is notable, but hardly his fault: courts hand down derisorily lenient sentences and parliament preserves the immunity of his top targets. Even if Mr Morar is just scratching the surface of the problem and if some or even many of his prosecutors are incompetent, it is hard to argue that things would be better if nothing was happening at all.
Third: the real story is a battle of political clans, one of which is using the “anti-corruption issue” to attack the other. This has a large element of truth, in that the political grouping headed by President Traian Basescu has indeed used the corruption issue to bash its opponents.
And the president’s deplorable way with advisers, plus unexplained parts of his communist-era personal history, when he had a plum job abroad, certainly give his critics some serious ammunition. But that does not mean that anti-corruption fight is a sham. Politics in a free society often involves parties pushing good causes for opportunistic reasons. At the very least the past couple of years have seen an end to the climate of impunity that long characterised Romanian politics.
Fourth: the corruption issue is exaggerated. Most Romanians don’t pay bribes and the non-corrupt bit of the economy is what matters. Certainly growth has boomed and foreign investment has been flooding in. Yet those same foreign investors lament the damage corruption does. In particular, corruption in the education system devalues the “currency” issued by schools and universities—they will eventually become meaningless. And it is hard, if not impossible, for public administration to produce a modern infrastructure in a system plagued by corruption. Without that, growth will be throttled.
Five: this isn’t about morals. Corruption is just a symptom of bad government. True. It would be insane to start an anti-corruption drive by locking up all the doctors and teachers who take under-the-desk payments. But that is no excuse for leaving things as they are. Better salaries in the public sector are a necessary condition for ending corruption. So is more transparency. But it is also essential to punish flagrant wrongdoers, particularly at the top. Without that, no anti-corruption drive will have any credibility.
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Security thumbsucker |
A bowl of thin alphabet soup
Aug 7th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The Kremlin wants a new security club for Europe and Asia. Can it work? And should it worry America, which is relearning to love its allies?
WHETHER the story is Muslim separatists killing Chinese policemen, Iran threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz to Western oil tankers, lethal fighting in a breakaway province of Georgia or Russia planning to put nuclear bombers in Cuba in retaliation for perceived American adventurism in Europe—just to take news items from the past few days—it is easy to see why officials in Moscow, Beijing and elsewhere think the security of the Eurasian land mass could be in better hands. Old alliances such as NATO, and looser outfits such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), do not seem to fit the bill. They are, critics say, too narrow in their membership, legally flimsy and too old-fashioned in their scope. High time, so it would seem, for something better.
That, roughly, is the thinking in Moscow, where for the first time in years Russia seems to be offering new ideas rather than old grumbles. Fuller details are promised in September. For now, the plan as outlined by President Dmitry Medvedev, and promoted by Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, is to have a big international conference in Moscow next year, attended by all NATO and EU countries, Russia and its ex-Soviet allies, as well as China and (probably) India, to set up a new security organisation to deal with issues such as terrorism and illegal migration. And who could object to that?
So far, the Western response has been muted. Some countries in Europe like the idea of a security structure that would rely less on American hegemony and more on international law. Others are privately sceptical, but think it would be rude to dismiss the plan before hearing it in full.
The idea of security organisations that span Europe and Asia is nothing new. Russia and China set one up by treaty in 1996. In 2001 it became the six-member Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (India and three other countries are observers). This aims to deal with the three big dangers (at least as seen by autocratic multi-ethnic countries): terrorism, separatism and extremism. The outsiders who support Islamist extremists in the North Caucasus are likely to be the same people who back Muslim separatists in China’s far west and insurgents in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley—so the thinking goes. The SCO’s chief role is still to swap information and co-ordinate anti-terrorist work.
It has gained weight since then, becoming both a talking-shop for countries twitchy about American dominance and developing a loose military role. Last year member states played war games in Central Asia—the biggest Russian-Chinese shindig of that kind since the Sino-Soviet split half a century ago. That prompted panicky reactions: “OPEC with bombs” or “the WWW” (World Without the West).
Such talk is exaggerated. Bobo Lo, a London-based security pundit and author of a forthcoming book called “Axis of Convenience”, says the SCO’s main aim is to promote Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia “without spooking the natives”—in other words, smaller countries in the area. If it becomes too controversial, it loses usefulness. A Tajik-backed bid for Iran to get full membership, launched in April, has got nowhere.
One aim of the Russian plan may be to nudge Western countries into taking the SCO more seriously. It would have a seat at the table at the planned conference, ranking alongside international bodies such as NATO. Western nervousness about the SCO and similar bodies risks looking hypocritical: the EU and NATO fume about Russia’s use of “divide and rule” tactics, using bilateral arrangements to undermine multilateral organisations. Yet that is pretty much how the West treats Kremlin-sponsored international organisations.
But the big problem facing any new organisation is not Western fastidiousness but deeper conflicts of values and interests. Even the SCO does not function altogether smoothly. Russia and China are partners on some things, but rivals on others. Arms sales from Russia to China have slumped in the past two years. Russian policymakers realise that a rising China will become a steadily stronger neighbour, keen to redress past injustices. In the long term, says Mr Lo, these may include “red line” issues, such as the territories that a weakened Chinese empire ceded to tsarist Russia. That imbalance seems to be diminishing Russian enthusiasm. Russia is resisting full Chinese membership of the G8. Talk in Moscow of a “multipolar world” has given way to praise for “common European civilisation”. “They are worried that in a multipolar world not all poles are going to be equal,” says Mr Lo.
So how would the new Eurasian security organisation reach agreement? Disputes between pro-Western and pro-Russian states have crippled the consensus-based OSCE, an outfit that was once much liked by Russia as a non-military alternative to NATO. Russia banned OSCE election monitors from recent elections and has sidelined it in escalating conflicts such as Georgia (see article). So the new outfit is unlikely to find agreement more easy.
America and European countries will be encouraged if Russia truly wants to be part of a space that foreign-policy wonks such as Dmitri Trenin at the Carnegie think-tank in Moscow call the “Greater West”. But the problem is that being “Western” is hard to define. Speeches by Russian policymakers seem to reflect a 19th century understanding of Western-ness, based on a mixture of national sovereignty and a common cultural heritage in Christianity.
Those ideas are out of step with the realities of the 21st century. Western countries now sign up to lots of sovereignty-limiting multilateral accords, and try to live up to agreed standards on human rights and political freedom. Such agreements are anathema to many in Russia and other SCO countries, who see them as hypocritical and irrelevant to security.
In practice, it is often either the propagation of common values (in the case of NATO) or common dislike of those values (in the case of the SCO) that provides the sort of glue that can hold an international body together. Is any ideological glue strong enough to fuse the whole of Eurasia into a single unit? On any of the challenges common to all the countries in that vast area—from collective security to energy supplies to minority rights—views diverge. Until that changes, the prospects for the Russian grand design look dim.
Thursday, July 31, 2008
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EU Divorce law |
Divorce without borders
Jul 31st 2008
From The Economist print edition
A simpler way to part ways
SHE was French; he was English; they had just moved to London from Paris. When he found out about her affair, she begged for a reconciliation. He was more ruthless: the same afternoon, he filed for divorce in France, one of the stingiest jurisdictions in Europe for the non-earning spouse and where adultery affects the court’s ruling. Had she filed first in England her conduct would have been irrelevant, and she would have had a good chance of a large share of the marital assets, and even maintenance for life.
International divorce is full of such dramas and anomalies, so the natural response of policymakers is to try to make things simpler and more predictable. But the biggest attempt in recent years to do just that, in a European agreement called Rome III, has just been shelved. Instead, several EU countries are now pressing ahead with their own harmonisation deal. Many wonder if it will work any better.
At issue is the vexed question of which country’s law applies to the break-up of a mixed marriage. The spouses may live long-term in a third country and be temporarily working in a fourth. The worst way to sort that out is with expensive legal battles in multiple jurisdictions.
The main principle at present is that the first court to be approached hears the case. Introduced in 2001, this practice has worked well in preventing international legal battles, but has made couples much more trigger-happy, because the spouse who hesitates in order to save a troubled marriage may lose a huge amount of money. Rome III aimed to remove the incentive to go to court quickly. Instead, courts in any EU country would automatically apply the local law that had chiefly governed the marriage. This approach is already in force in countries such as the Netherlands. A couple that moved there and sought divorce having spent most of the marriage in France, say, would find a Dutch court dividing assets and handling child custody according to French law.
That works fine among continental European countries where legal systems, based on Roman law, leave little role for precedent or the judge’s discretion. You can look up the rules on a website and apply them. But it is anathema in places such as England, where the system favours a thorough (and often expensive) investigation of the details of each case, and then lets judges decide according to previous cases and English law.
Another snag is that what may suit middle-class expatriates in Brussels (who just happened to be the people drafting Rome III) may not suit, for example, a mixed marriage that has mainly been based in a country, perhaps not even an EU member, with a sharply different divorce law. Swedish politicians don’t like the idea that their courts would be asked to enforce marriage laws based on, say, Islamic sharia.
The threat of vetoes from Sweden and like-minded countries has blocked Rome III. But a group of nine countries, led by Spain and France, is going ahead. They are resorting to a provision in EU rules—never before invoked—called “enhanced co-operation”. This sets a precedent for a “multi-speed” Europe in which like-minded countries are allowed to move towards greater integration, rather than seeking a “big-bang” binding treaty that scoops up the willing and unwilling alike. Some countries worry that using enhanced co-operation will create unmanageable layers of complexity, with EU law replaced by multiple ad hoc agreements.
The real lesson may be that Rome III was just too ambitious. A more modest but useful goal would be simply to clarify the factors that determine which court hears a divorce, and then let that court apply its own law. David Hodson, a British expert, proposes an international deal that would start by giving greatest weight to any prenuptial agreement, followed by long-term residency, and then take into account other factors such as nationality. That would then make it easier to end marriages amicably, with mediation and out-of-court agreement, rather than a race to start the beastly business of litigation.











