Kati Marton

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A child in communist Hungary

Little girls, big story

Nov 19th 2009
From The Economist print edition

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Capitalist rulers are so much nicer

Enemies of the People: My Family’s Journey to America. By Kati Marton. Simon & Schuster; 288 pages; $26. Buy from Amazon.com

COMMUNIST bullies had a nasty trick when dealing with opponents who had children: they took them away, sometimes to be adopted by childless party stalwarts, in nastier cases to be sent to orphanages and treated as the children of criminals, or even to be consigned to an asylum. In retrospect it seems astonishing that Endre and Ilona Marton, a married couple working for American news agencies in Hungary at the height of the Stalinist era, exposed their two small daughters to such risks, their greatest fear. But they did. Decades later the younger, Kati (pictured with Bill Clinton), has pieced together her family’s missing history, a series of torments that epitomises the human cost of the communist seizure of central Europe.

Ms Marton’s main source is the now declassified secret-police files compiled by the AVO, Hungary’s version of the KGB. They chronicled minutely her parents’ professional and social lives, which moved in ever-decreasing circles as the communist grip on Hungary tightened. Sometimes the result is welcome: an AVO snooper’s stolid note brings back long-forgotten memories of a summer picnic. More often it is grim: almost everyone, it turns out, was informing on the Martons, from neighbours to the nanny. Through it all, her father baffled his persecutors, who could not believe that the suave, stylish polyglot was just what he claimed to be: a hard-living, hard-playing newsman. His undoing came when a traitor in the American embassy reported that he had lent to officials there a copy of an official document, the state budget. Not exactly a secret, but pretext enough to send him to be broken in the AVO’s dungeons.

Few grown-ups come out well in this story. Hungarian officials were callous and uncomprehending. Friends proved unreliable. Mr Marton’s American employers dithered, while American diplomats doubted the Martons’ reliability. Mr Marton’s bravado remains incomprehensible, even to his adoring daughter 50 years later. In the midst of it all are two little girls, precociously aware of the dramas swirling around them, left crying on the pavement when their mother is snatched from their home to join their father in jail. A Utah couple, reading that the girls were being brought up by strangers, offered, in vain, to adopt them.

Ms Marton avoids being too self-centred or sentimental as she tells the story. She highlights uncomfortable discoveries—her parents’ infidelities, that her grandparents perished at Auschwitz—as well as noble ones. Her descriptions of Hungary, of communist history and of secret-police tactics are all sharply drawn. So is the portrayal of the family’s life in America: they managed to escape after the 1956 uprising. The happy ending comes as a great relief after so many nerve-racking pages.

Slovakia/Hungary

Europe.view

Linguistic discontents
Oct 29th 2009
From Economist.com


Slovaks, Hungarians and missing data

THE row is over but the problems remain. Amid an outcry from neighbouring Hungary, and discreet pressure from other outsiders, Slovakia’s government has backed away, for the moment, from implementing its badly drafted and intrusive-sounding new language law.

Despite the backdown, hopes that membership of the European Union and NATO would bring a permanent end to central Europe’s tribal conflicts and historical grudges now look over-optimistic. It would be good if all concerned—the Slovak government, Hungarians in Slovakia and Hungary’s political parties—paused for reflection about the troubling issues that divide them. But the economic crisis, and the likely victory of the tough-talking Viktor Orban and his right-of-centre Fidesz party in Hungary’s parliamentary elections next year, are among the reasons for expecting another flare-up sooner rather than later.

A short list of Hungarian grievances would go like this. Since 1992 the new Slovak state has made its largest linguistic minority feel like outsiders. Native Slovak-speakers increasingly dominate the upper reaches of government; the handful of Magyarphones in the diplomatic service has been purged (from ten ambassadors to one, for example). The parts of southern Slovakia where Hungarians tend to live have missed out on foreign investment and have the worst public services. Bilingualism is declining: few mother-tongue Slovaks learn Hungarian; Hungarian-language schools teach Slovak remarkably badly. The rise of the Slovak National Party has made anti-Hungarian racism alarmingly acceptable in public life.

Slovak grievances read rather differently. Hungary has a conceptual problem in accepting that Slovakia is a real country. Public figures there stir up Slovakia’s Hungarians with reheated historical wrongs. The number of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia is exaggerated: many of them are in fact Gypsies (Roma). All citizens of Slovakia are equal before the law and talk of discrimination is absurd. All efforts to pamper the Hungarians just make them complain all the more, in an annoying and disloyal way. If Hungarian-speakers really do not feel at home in Slovakia then they can leave.

To an outsider, the striking thing is the prevalence of assertion and the absence of facts. How many people in Slovakia are really “ethnic Hungarians” as opposed to, say, Hungarian-speaking Roma, or native Slovak-speakers with Hungarian surnames, or the products of mixed marriages who do not regard themselves as being fully in one camp or the other? Are those who self-identify as ethnic Hungarians better or worse paid, housed or educated than other population groups? Is this changing over time? Is bilingualism declining? How many go to Hungary for higher education? How do their fortunes compare to Slovak universities’ alumni? What are the statistics on mixed marriages, migration, and life expectancy? And how do all these compare to the comparable population groups in Hungary proper, and to Hungarians living in other places such as Transylvania in Romania or the Vojvodina province of Serbia?

Nobody seems to be collecting this data, either in official statistics or in academic surveys. Lessons could be learned from Britain’s diplomatic service, which makes a big effort to attract applicants from a wide range of class, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds and monitors how successful this has been. But Slovak officials react with shock at the idea that monitoring the composition of the civil service could help settle arguments about prejudice. “It would not be politically correct” says a senior government spokesman.

That seems a rather lazy and complacent approach. Consequently, without even the elementary information to know what is right and what to do, the two sides remain entrenched in their silos of ignorance, making myths, and sooner or later, mischief.

Europe view 134, history

EUROPE

Europe.view

Magistra vitae?
May 28th 2009
From Economist.com


The fine line between disagreement and propaganda
FORGET gas, nukes or Iran. The deep divide between Russia and its western neighbours is about history. President Dmitry Medvedev has set up a commission to look at “falsifications of history that damage Russia’s interests” (he should use a comma: this phrasing implies that other falsifications promote Russia’s interests). A draft law in the Duma would criminalise equating Stalin and Hitler, or denying that the Red Army “liberated” eastern Europe from fascism. Whether out of cynicism or nostalgia, Russia’s rulers have resurrected the Soviet view of history, itself a product of the Stalin era. For the countries of central and eastern Europe, this is not just obnoxious, but threatening.

It would of course be foolish to expect complete harmony between Russian and western views of history. British and French textbooks seem to describe utterly different events when the many wars between the two countries are concerned (as a schoolboy in Britain, your columnist could never quite work out why the hardy and heroic English won victory after victory—but ended up losing to the supposedly far inferior French).

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History is in the telling


Moreover, no version of history is final and nothing should be taboo. Plenty of questions about the past century remain unanswered, not least about Britain’s role. How far did Neville Chamberlain’s shameful betrayal of Czechoslovakia in the Munich agreement prompt Stalin to intensify his friendship with Hitler? And how should blame for the catastrophe of the Warsaw Uprising be shared between the Polish military leadership on the ground, the government-in-exile in London, the British and American authorities, and the Soviet Union?

Similarly, different forms of collaboration during the war deserve more study. Should, for example, the émigré Cossack leaders such as Pyotr Krasnov who fought on Hitler’s side be counted in the same category as the Russian Liberation Army of General Andrei Vlasov, formed by captured Soviet soldiers? Tens of thousands of Russians fought alongside the Nazis, with mixed motives: deluded, desperate and despicable. How might they be compared with the Estonians and Latvians who fought the Soviet advance in 1944? It is easy to paint the past in simple brushstrokes of evil black and brilliant white. But adding carefully chosen shades of grey creates a more informative picture.

Sadly, Russia is not looking for such nuances. Indeed, it is demanding that other countries abandon complexity and fit their history into the Soviet straitjacket. This may resonate inside Russia but it rings the wrong bells abroad, particularly as grim anniversaries approach: the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet attack on Poland, the annexation of the Baltic states and Western Ukraine, and the massacre of captured Polish officers at Katyn.

Soviet authorities found it hard enough to explain Stalin-era crimes convincingly, even with complete control over the media and the secret documents safely locked away in a Kremlin safe. It will be still harder for Russia to try to revive the same arguments now. Indeed, the more Russian propagandists insist, the more loudly other countries will shout their version. They may sound a bit hysterical to a western audience that finds history rather boring. But Russia will sound worse: bullying and mendacious.

Vladimir Putin’s remarks in Budapest on the anniversary of the 1956 Soviet invasion were a model of how to sound tactful and contrite without exactly apologising. That could have worked elsewhere. Poland has been trying softly-softly tactics on Katyn, hoping that it would make it easier for Russia to back down on issues such as opening the files. But the response was “What do we get in return?” Such an approach might be justified in trade negotiations. Applied to an unsolved case of mass murder, it sounds wrong.

Smouldering

Eastern Europe
Nov 6th 2008 | RIGA
From The Economist print edition


The ex-communist economies have been steadied. Deeper worries remain

How much will you give me to stop playing?

FLAMES out, but smoke still rising. That is how eastern Europe looks after huge outside intervention to douse worries in debt and currency markets. An IMF board meeting on November 5th approved a lightly conditioned $16.5 billion bail-out for Ukraine. Austria has offered a €100 billion ($129 billion) package for its banks, which are owed $290 billion by east European borrowers: Erste Bank took up a €2.7 billion equity injection on October 30th. In Hungary, which has also received an IMF bail-out, markets firmed as parliament passed a tough fiscal package, based on an expected 1% fall in GDP. Serbia, which is in talks with the IMF, said it would not need extra cash, though it might draw on its $695 billion deposit at the fund.

In London Latvia’s central-bank governor, Ilmars Rimsevics, sought to quell fears that his country faced a meltdown on Icelandic lines.

Flanked by representatives of Swedbank and Nordea, two Nordic banks which own a large chunk of the local banking system, he said Latvia’s currency peg to the euro was not in doubt. Unlike Iceland, Latvia has little external public debt and a thinly traded currency. But questions remain over some locally owned banks and the legacy of reckless fiscal policies (described by one minister as “hitting the gas pedal”). That brought double-digit growth, but did little for competitiveness. The coming months could bring a contraction of up to 5% in Latvia’s GDP.

The intricacies of Latvian economic policy may no longer hold foreigners’ attention. “We were getting a lot of calls about the Baltics and Scandinavian banks a couple of weeks ago. Now attention has shifted to Bulgaria,” says Neil Shearing of Capital Economics, a consultancy. Bulgaria has a large current-account deficit (expected to be 24% of GDP this year). So far, this has been filled by inflows of foreign direct investment. That looks good on paper (it is reliance on short-term borrowing that sets red lights flashing). But up to a third of that money went into property, inflating a bubble that has now popped.

Neighbouring Romania, the poorest country in the European Union, has problems too. Standard and Poor’s, a rating agency, downgraded its debt to junk last month. And the slowdown in “old Europe” will hit remittances from the many Romanians working abroad.

Foreign investment flows to eastern Europe may be shrinking too, now that businesses in the rich half of Europe have less cash to spare for foreign expansion. Having neglected competitiveness-stoking reforms in education, infrastructure, and public administration, ex-communist countries may find it harder to attract companies needing to cut costs. Governments in eastern Europe are now hurrying to adopt the macroeconomic policies necessary to speed the adoption of the euro. But their countries’ deeper problems remain.

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The IMF and eastern Europe

Into the breach
Oct 27th 2008
From Economist.com


The IMF helps eastern Europe’s two most vulnerable economies. Will it stop the rot?

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SIX months ago it all looked so different. The countries of eastern Europe were the poster-children of economic reform: having privatised, deregulated and stabilised after the collapse of communism, they seemed on a clear path leading to convergence with the richer half of the continent.

That picture was always a bit optimistic. Now it looks wildly out of date. A noxious cocktail of public foreign debt, heavy private borrowing in foreign currencies, big current-account deficits, lax public-spending controls and wobbly governments (different in each country but all potentially lethal in conditions of collapsing investor confidence) has sent policymakers scurrying to talk to the ultimate financial backstop: the International Monetary Fund.

This weekend, the IMF reached broad agreement on big bail-out packages for both Hungary and Ukraine. On October 22nd Hungary had raised its interest rate to an economy-crunching 11.5% (up from 8.5%) in the hope of halting steep falls in its currency, the forint. Fortuitously, the Hungarian markets then closed for a two-day break, followed by the weekend.

Over the weekend, as the hours ticked closer to the moment of the Hungarian markets’ reopening, the IMF was scrambling to gain agreement from the European Union, countries such as Germany, Austria and Italy, and other international lenders such as the World Bank, to support the bail-out. That task was hindered by Europe’s leaders' absence at an international EU-China summit in Beijing.



The rule in such panicky conditions is “the more the better”. The bail-out needs to be big enough to reassure lenders that they can roll over existing Hungarian debt. If not, the economy faces meltdown. Late on Sunday, time ran out to present the plan in full. Instead, the IMF issued a statement endorsing the Hungarian authorities’ planned stabilisation measures. “The policies Hungary envisages justify an exceptional level of access to Fund resources,” said the IMF’s managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. On Monday, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development issued a statement supporting the IMF plan. It could play an important role in recapitalising Hungary’s banks. Earlier this month the European Central Bank took the extraordinary step of issuing a €5 billion ($6.7 billion) credit line to Hungary’s central bank (Hungary is not in the euro zone). More may be in store.

The central feature of the plan is reform of public finances. But the room for manoeuvre is limited. Hungary’s growth is already feeble—likely to be only 2% this year. The government had already reined in spending and lifted taxes, and became highly unpopular as a result. More of the same risks plunging the country into recession. But without tough measures, international lenders may just walk away.

The early verdict from the market was sceptical: shares plunged by a further 10% when the market opened on Monday. That adds urgency to the need to finalise the deal. Those involved hope to have it ready by Wednesday. Politics is playing a big role. America sees Hungary as a strictly European problem, but has been pushing the IMF to provide more generous and immediate help for the other stricken economy, Ukraine.

Riven by political disputes, Ukraine is vulnerable in a crisis to its cash-rich neighbour, Russia. The Fund said on Sunday that it had agreed a $16.5 billion two-year loan to Ukraine, although it is unclear how the country, which lacks a government and is facing its third parliamentary election in three years, is in any position to adopt the tough economic policies needed to restore confidence.

A statement by the Fund said that it was moving “expeditiously” and that the programme would focus on “essential upfront measures”. It did not stipulate what these might be. A joint central bank and finance ministry statement mentioned a balanced budget and legislative moves to support the banking system. Parliament, normally fractious and deadlocked, is due to meet on Tuesday. Outsiders will be watching closely.