Khuiyovich latest

(this interesting document appears to be a draft memo prepared by Col Khuiyovich, who is a senior member of the foreign-policy planning staff of Russia's intelligence service.) I do not guarantee its authenticity.


From oleg.khuiyovich@svr.ru
to vvp@gov.ru
cc dam@kremlin.ru


The great success of our Georgia campaign callsfor a re-assessment of our strategical options.

We can either follow up with similar moves in for example Latvia or the Ukraine or we can move pro tem to a softly-softly approach to avoid stiffening reistence unnecessarily.

Option I

We destabilise other countries in the near abroad, and then move in to restore law and order, and to protect Russian citizens from harassment and harm.

Advantages: easy success, effective warning to rest of near abroad

Both NATO and the EU have shown that they are afraid to bite, and think that barking will do instead. They have more or less said that they will not lift a finger to help the Ukraine, and they won't either to help the Baltic States when push come to shove.

If we were to adopt Option I, I recommend we do Latvia next.

1. It would give us Riga, the main port in the region

2. It has a large Russsian minority

3. It would make Estonaia and Lithuania indefensible.

4. It would forestall any deployment of NATO forces in the Baltics

As regards 1 and 2, Ukraine is similar case, but we have actually got the use of Sevastopol for the immediate future, and the Russian minority is so large that it may be able to vote us into re-assimilating the Ukraine without the need for force. Use of force, though effective, is costly, as I shall argue later.

My fourth point is hypothetical. There is some danger that NATO may raise the stakes by placing armed forces in the Baltics, which would make future operations there more hazardous and costly. If we move quickly there is not much NATO can do. The Americans are busy with their elections. There are a few British troops still stationed in Germany, and the British navy could get itself into the Baltic in a day or two, just in time to evacuate a defeated expeditionary force from Klaipeda, or some other suitable Dunkirk. The Germans are divided with a potential von Ribbentrop in the Foreign Office and many vocal appeasers in the Bundestag. Sarkozy is good on gestures, but not one to get France to bite the bullet.

Option II

We sheathe the sabre, and use soft power.

Advantages: less hazardous, less confrontational, great potential for disuniting the enemy, makes full use of unusual window of opportunity.

In spite of all the noise and professed outrage over the disciplining of Georgia, most people in the West will be only too glad to be allowed to forget and go back to sleep. Some British MPs are already saying ``South Ossetia is a far away country, of no importance to us. There are several members of the British House of Lords who insist that Russia is different from what it used to be, and poses no threat to the West. There is enormous anti-Americanism which likens Georgia to Cuba, and Poland to Mexico. President Bush can be relied on to make America appear to the chattering classes as unattractive as Russia, and is in no position in the last months of his Presidency to rouse the Americans to do anything effective. All the members of NATO are in financial trouble, and unwilling to afford the cost or not doing business with us, and especially of not buying our gas and oil. This may not hold good in time to come, but at the present it gives us the whip hand economically, and we can use it wihtout fear of repercussions.

If we pursue option II, we need to pay particular attentiion to France, Germany, Italy and Britain.

1. France: M. Sarkozy is feeling affronted that the “peace in our time” ceasefire that he brought back is only a scrap of paper, and does not mean anything on the ground. A later much publicised withdrawal would ease his feelings, but the real thing to move him is economic. A sympathetic treatment of the very considerable French interests in Russia will quickly bring him to heel.

2. Germany: Ms Merkel has spoken out against our work in Georgia, but that is largely for public consumption. The Baltic pipeline is still to be constructed. If we can offer some further oily inducements, she will be sensible. In due course a Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (but secret of course ) may be available.

3. Italy: bribing MPs is cheap and effective.

4. Britain: Unfortunately Britain does not depend on us for oil or gas, but its energy policy is hamstrung by continued dithering over nuclear energy. We need to keep it that way. We need to coordinate a series of demosntrations against nuclear power, using green arguments about waste disposal and the virtues of wind- and wave-power. There is a large body of pacifist sentiment which we can nurture. Most important however are business men and (mostly) conservative politicians who hope to make money out of business in Russia. We have already brought a number of accountants and lawyers to heel, and the bankers are in no position to mount high moral horses at present.

Conclision

Both strategies have merits, but I think Optioin II is better. Optioin I involves a series of high-profile crises which may galvanise opinion against us. The Rhineland worked because Britain would not back France. Munich worked because Britain and France were believed that there was an alternative to fighting. But that was enough to persuade almost everyone in Britain that Hitler had to be stopped, and he was stopped. We can get the Ukraine, and then might get Latvia, though better the other way nround. But then the peaceniks in the US and UK will have lost all credibility, and even chartered accountants will no longer look just to the profits to be had from rendering professional services to RosUkrEnergo and the like. Although Bush and Brown seem to be in terminal decline, the one thing each can do is to stand up for national security at a time of visible threat. Iraq would be forgotten and forgiven if memories of the Cold War were revived. It would be the one thing that each could do to restore his public standing. Better avoid excitement, and relying on soft power let somnolent democracies lie down and sleep.